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ABSTRACT 
Brendan J. Rowell: A Sea Change for the Transatlantic Security Regime? Maritime Security 
Cooperation, Coordination and Competition in the Horn of Africa Region 
(Under the direction of Robert Jenkins) 
 
The end of Cold War-era bipolarity and the rise of global multipolarity have been 
particularly consequential for the transatlantic security regime. This regime has seen the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization‘s expansion into out-of-area operations and the emergence of the 
European Union as a security actor in its own right. Yet consistent formal cooperation between 
those two actors has proven difficult, and the United States of America has increasingly sought 
to achieve its security objectives through alternative multinational fora—seemingly 
reconsidering the mantle of its historical hegemony within the regime. By exploring recent 
interactions between these three actors at the political level and through the lens of their 
overlapping counter-piracy operations in the Horn of Africa region, this thesis seeks to establish 
whether such concurrent missions indicate increased security competition between historical 
allies, or rather, the advent of more flexible modalities in transatlantic security cooperation. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION TO THE PROBLEM
The United States of America has dealt with piracy since its independence; its diplomatic 
and military resolution to conflicts with Barbary pirates in today‘s Middle East and North Africa 
region even involved an attempt to build a ―coalition of the willing‖ among European naval 
powers of the era.1  However, the re-emergence of piracy in the Gulf of Aden, within the Horn of 
Africa region, only began to receive global attention in the mid-2000s, at which point attacks 
began to be perceived less as isolated events and more as concentrated threat to an important 
global shipping corridor. However, formal multinational counter-piracy operations in the Horn 
of Africa region  only began subsequent to the United Nations Security Council‘s resolution 1851 
in 2008, which called for ―...those States and organizations able to do so to actively participate in 
defeating piracy and armed robbery off Somalia‘s coast by deploying naval vessels and military 
aircraft…‖.2 
Although UN Security Council Resolution 1851 has often been justified as a means by 
which to call on UN member countries to defend World Food Program aid shipments to 
Somalia, the Horn of Africa and greater Indian Ocean regions are also of substantial importance 
for world trade.  The Gulf of Aden hosts the Bab el-Mandeb strait, a critical choke point for 
international maritime commerce in general and for energy flows via oil tankers in particular. 
The Bab el-Mandeb strait links the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean; 95 percent of 
European Union Member States‘ seaborne trade and 20 percent of the world‘s total seaborne 
                                                        
1 Gerald W. Gawalt, ―America and the Barbary Pirates: An International Battle Against An Uncoventional 
Foe,‖ Library of Congress, Washington, DC, 
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/collections/jefferson_papers/mtjprece.html.  
2 United Nations Security Council, ―Resolution 1851,‖ United Nations Security Council, 2008, 
http://www.un.org/press/en/2008/sc9541.doc.htm. 
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trade (by volume) are transited through the Gulf of Aden alone.3 The U.S. Energy Information 
Administration estimates that approximately 3.8 million barrels of crude and refined oil 
products per day flowed northward towards Europe and the United States in 2013.4 While this 
only represented around 6.7 percent of all petroleum transported by sea in 2013, the closure of 
the Strait ―...would have serious consequences, forcing a detour around the Cape of Good 
Hope...‖ and restricting tanker access to the Suez Canal.5 Thus, the disrupted flow of a sea line of 
communication (SLOC) that has both strategic commercial and military value could logically 
entail negative impacts for world trade and regional and global stability.6  
 
The threats posed by regional maritime piracy have engendered a considerable 
international response. The Horn of Africa region currently hosts several different naval 
counter-piracy operations, including the US-led Combined Task Force 151/Combined Maritime 
Forces, the European Union‘s Operation Atalanta, and NATO‘s Ocean Shield operation, as well 
as other regional and extra-regional actors.7 The EU Naval Forces provides the following map to 
the public, which gives an idea of the geographical extent the extent of piracy attacks in the 
region: 
 
                                                        
3 EU External Action Service, ―MSCHOA.‖ European External Action Service, accessed April 12, 2015, 
http://eunavfor.eu/mschoa/European Union Naval Forces. 
4 United States Energy Information Administration, ―World Oil Transit Chokepoints,‖ United States 
Energy Information Administration, November 10, 2014, accessed April 12, 2015, 
http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/wotc.pdf. 
5 Ibid. 
6 Jean-Paul Rodrigue and Theo Notteboom, ―Strategic Maritime Passages: Global Maritime Routes and 
Chokepoints,‖ The Geography of Transport Systems, 2013, accessed April 12, 2015, 
https://people.hofstra.edu/geotrans/eng/ch1en/appl1en/ch1a2en.html. 
7 For ease, the term Horn of Africa will be used forthwith to describe the maritime region that has been 
host to incidences of Somali piracy, extending from the Bab el-Mandeb Strait in the northwest, the coast 
of Mozambique in the southwest, the Persian gulf in the Northeast, and to the stretches of the Arabian sea 
where it meets Indian coast at its easternmost point. In reality this appellation covers several maritime 
sub-regions within the greater Indian Ocean region. A map is provided below for clarity. 
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Figure 1 – Map of Recorded Incidences of Piracy in the Horn of Africa Region8 
 
 
Source: EUNAVFOR via The Atlantic Council of Canada.: http://natocouncil.ca/an-overview-
of-somali-piracy/ 
This thesis is primarily concerned with interactions between the first three actors—the 
U.S., the EU, and NATO—in the context of the historical transatlantic security regime (TSR) and 
in this specific field of operations. Without a single unified command, collective pooling of 
military assets, or other common aspects of formal security cooperation, their simultaneous 
missions have presided over a sharp decline in incidences of regional piracy. Is this evidence of 
security competition between historical allies, or have the modalities of transatlantic security 
cooperation evolved?  Elsewhere, the prospect of a common European defense is bleak, while 
EU –NATO security cooperation in other key regions has proven increasingly difficult. How can 
this be explained? This thesis seeks to answer these questions by examining the prevailing 
                                                        
8 Steven Chadwick, ―An Overview of Somali Piracy,‖ The Atlantic Council of Canada, June 6, 2014, 
accessed April 12, 2015, http://natocouncil.ca/an-overview-of-somali-piracy/. 
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political and institutional conditions of the transatlantic security regime and analyzing how 
these have impacted Western counter-piracy operations in the region.  
This thesis will examine the general recent evolution of the TSR and the implication of 
this evolution for the relationships between the United States of America, the European Union, 
and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization at both political and operational levels of 
interaction, as well as specific impacts regarding interactions between the respective actors‘ 
counter-piracy missions in the Horn of Africa region since 2008. 
  This task will be accomplished over the course of six chapters, including this opening 
chapter. The second chapter will formally state the research question and its corresponding 
hypothesis, as well as the methodology and operational definitions used to address these. In the 
third chapter, a theoretical framework will be developed in order to conceptualize the evolution 
of the TSR by making use of regime and hegemonic stability theories. This conceptualization will 
be applied in the fourth chapter‘s treatment of how the TSR has evolved in practice, and how 
this has affected interactions between its primary actors, the U.S., the EU, and NATO. The fifth 
chapter features the thesis case study, which explores the concrete implications of these actors‘ 
relationships for their ongoing and simultaneous counter-piracy missions in the Horn of Africa 
region at the political and operational levels. The sixth and final chapter will summarize the 
thesis findings and present its conclusions. 
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CHAPTER TWO: RESEARCH QUESTION, HYPOTHESIS, AND METHODOLOGY
What can the presence of parallel Western naval operations in the Horn of Africa tell us 
about the evolution and current state of the transatlantic security regime (TSR): do interactions 
between simultaneous and similar missions indicate increased inter-actor competition or do 
they reflect cooperation and thus greater flexibility within the TSR? 
This thesis holds that the simultaneous presence of three parallel Western naval 
operations to combat piracy in the Horn of Africa region reflects an evolving TSR which has 
grown to accommodate a new and increasingly independent security actor in the form of the 
European Union; while this overlap indeed indicates increased interorganizational competition 
within the TSR, the effects of such competition seem to be at least partially mitigated by 
informal cooperation and coordination in the case study‘s theater of operation. 
 
2.1  Methodology and Operational Definitions 
This thesis will examine the current state of the transatlantic security consensus by 
undertaking a case study of Western counter-piracy efforts in the Gulf of Aden. To that end, it 
will rely on both on secondary sources, via a thorough review of pertinent literature on and 
analysis of transatlantic security cooperation—including its evolution in general and the 
counter-piracy efforts in particular—as well as primary sources, including official governmental 
and organizational communiqués and information from interviews conducted by other 
researchers. The thesis will apply theoretical frameworks in order to interpret these sources and 
draw conclusions on the implications of informal coordination between parallel counter-piracy 
operations for the future of the transatlantic security consensus. 
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The particularities of the parallel naval operations undertaken by the EU, NATO, and the 
United States will essentially be examined at two levels: the macro or politico-institutional level 
of interactions between states and international organizations and the impact of these on the 
micro or operational level of counter-piracy efforts. In order to accurately ascertain the nature of 
multilateral maritime security cooperation (MMSC) between the aforementioned actors and the 
implications of such, it is important to define concepts central to this thesis: cooperation, 
coordination and competition (as well as the distinction between the former two); the concept of 
an international regime; and finally, establishing what constitutes success for such a policy 
undertaking, both at the political and operational levels. 
 
2.2  Cooperation and Coordination 
 The Defense Security Cooperation Agency summarizes the U.S. perspective on security 
cooperation (SC) thusly: 
SC comprises all activities undertaken by the Department of Defense (DoD) to encourage 
and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic 
objectives. It includes all DoD interactions with foreign defense and security 
establishments, including all DoD-administered Security Assistance (SA) programs, that 
build defense and security relationships; promote specific U.S. security interests, 
including all international armaments cooperation activities and SA activities; develop 
allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations; 
and provide U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations. It is DoD 
policy that SC is an important tool of national security and foreign policy and is an 
integral element of the DoD mission. SC activities shall be planned, programmed, 
budgeted, and executed with the same high degree of attention and efficiency as other 
integral DoD activities. SC requirements shall be combined with other DoD 
requirements and implemented through standard DoD systems, facilities, and 
procedures.9 
 
We can thus see that the U.S. Department of Defense places great importance on security 
cooperation both as a strategic and practical concept, by affirming the importance of 
maintaining relationships with ―foreign defense and security establishments‖ and in ensuring 
                                                        
9 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, ―Chapter 1: Security Cooperation Overview and Relationships,‖ 
Defense Security Cooperation Agency Security Assistance Management Manual, 
http://www.samm.dsca.mil/chapter/chapter-1.  
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that efforts to do so are adequately resourced. In 2010, NATO‘s new Strategic Concept declared 
that ―cooperative security‖ would become a third core task along with collective defense and 
crisis management. Without providing a single definition, NATO observes that cooperative 
security should ―provide frameworks for political dialogue and regional cooperation and 
increase military interoperability‖ and lead to ―increased collaboration between different actors 
resulting in information sharing and the harmonization of resources and capabilities.‖10  
While it is harder to pin down a precise definition reflecting the EU‘s perspective on what 
amounts to security cooperation, its 2003 European Security Strategy document declares that 
―international cooperation is a necessity,‖ and that the EU must engage in multilateral 
cooperation with international organizations and develop or maintain ―partnerships with key 
actors.‖11 The document also makes specific reference to what we can logically regard as security 
cooperation: ―EU-NATO permanent arrangements, in particular Berlin Plus‖ which provides 
―the framework for the strategic partnership between the two organisations in crisis 
management.‖12 This last precision on the Berlin Plus framework will be of particular 
importance for the subject of this thesis, as Berlin Plus is in fact central to certain obstacles to 
EU-NATO security cooperation generally and specifically for the thesis‘ maritime security case 
study.  
It would seem that all three security actors share some overlapping concept of security 
cooperation involving the development and/or maintenance of relationships between each other 
and other security actors in the pursuit of common objectives, and that such cooperative 
relationship can include exchange and/or use of information, resources, and capabilities as well 
                                                        
10 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, ―Cooperative Security as NATO‘s Core Task - Building Security 
through Military Cooperation across the Globe,‖ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, September 7, 2011, 
accessed April 11, 2015, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_77718.htm.; emphasis added. 
11 European Council, A Secure Europe in a Better World - European Security Strategy (Brussels: 
European Council, December 12, 2003), 13, 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf. 
12 European Council, A Secure Europe in a Better World, 12. 
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as the possibility of integrated planning and command structures to support those pursuits. This 
comprehensive definition will serve as the thesis‘ general conception of what may constitute 
security cooperation generally and specifically between its main actors. For reasons related to 
the aforementioned Berlin Plus arrangement, it will be particularly attentive to the willful 
exchange of information related to respective operational actions by the actors involved.  
While such cooperation would be expected to be routine among members of the TSR, 
political realities to be discussed in greater depth later in this thesis have made it such that 
comprehensive cooperation has become rare between certain actors, notably between the EU 
and NATO since the EU‘s 2004 enlargement. In light of all of these actors‘ formal statements on 
the nature of cooperation, it would seem logical that political cooperation is the necessary pre-
condition for other components of security cooperation; however, the evidence presented in the 
case study indicates that such political cooperation is not always formal. In any event, political 
cooperation, either formal or informal, is a pre-condition for our working definition of 
coordination. We can identify coordination in situations where actors partially or wholly 
adapt/adjust their security and defense resources and efforts, including respective operations, as 
a result of prior cooperation in an effort to maximize synergies and minimize duplication of 
effort in pursuing common security and defense objectives.  
If cooperation is a pre-condition for coordination between diverse actors at the 
micro/operational level, it would seem logical to infer that political cooperation and 
coordination are both essential preconditions for any sort of either taking place at the 
operational level. Thus:  
Political Cooperation→ Political Coordination→ Operational Cooperation→ Operational 
Coordination 
 
Such a flow seems to be the logical progression for any sort of collaboration between discrete 
political actors, be they states or otherwise. It would seem consistent with this logic to assume 
that such collaboration should take place via formally established channels when such channels 
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exist. However, as this thesis will demonstrate in its subsequent case study and analysis of 
findings, prevailing political realities within the TSR has made the use of such formal channels 
(Berlin Plus) increasingly difficult and rare. While informal political cooperation is apparent in 
our case study, the second step of political coordination is obstructed. MMSC as described by 
the case study is thus better represented by: 
Informal Political Cooperation→ Informal Operational Cooperation→ Informal 
Operational Coordination. 13 
 
2.3  Inter-actor Competition within the TSR 
 The evolution of inter-actor relationships within the TSR, particularly recent 
developments in the EU-NATO relationship, will be discussed in greater depth in the following 
section. However, the concept of inter-organizational competition relates to the fact that the 
TSR, long presided over by a single regional security provider in the form of NATO, has seen the 
emergence of the EU as a discrete security actor within the regime. If this emergence reflects 
recognition among EU member states of the world‘s increasing multipolarity, it does not change 
the fact that where there was one actor tasked with regional security, now there are two. 
Working in careful consultation with the U.S., the EU‘s initial iteration of its security and 
defense organization, the ESDP was conceived of precisely to avoid what then U.S. Secretary of 
State Madeline Albright termed the ‗the ‗three Ds‘‘: no decoupling, no discrimination of non-EU 
allies and no duplication of NATO.14 This thesis argues that the latter two clauses implicitly 
express what the U.S. and NATO perspective on what would constitute inter-organizational 
―competition‖ within the TSR. The 2003 Berlin Plus arrangement was intended to further 
reinforce the specific modalities through which the EU and NATO could cooperate, thereby 
precluding the possibility of such competition. However, as discussed in subsequent sections, 
                                                        
13 In which informal refers to cooperation and coordination outside of formally established frameworks 
such as that intended by the 2003 Berlin Plus arrangement on EU-NATO interaction. 
14 Marcin Zaborowski, ―How to Renew Transatlantic Relations in the 21st Century‖, The International 
Spectator, 46, no. 1 (2011), 106. 
 10 
the Berlin Plus framework has not always led to the clearly delineated cooperation it was 
designed to facilitate. 
 In this sense, it is perhaps best to conceive of security competition within the TSR by 
using an ecological definition of the word, which states that competition is any ―interaction 
between animal or plant species, or individual organisms that are attempting to gain a share of a 
limited environmental resource‖ NATO and the EU represent organisms within the TSR 
ecosystem; the finite environmental resources can represent actual resources including military 
assets, but also more intangible resources like legitimacy and primacy. 15 In this case, an actor‘s 
legitimacy would play a major role in maintaining and/or garnering the necessary political 
support of and preferred status among its member states, especially when 21 of those member 
states overlap as with the EU and NATO. The question of legitimacy plays an additional role as 
the two actors‘ scope of activities increases. Primacy also plays a distinct role as a resource as 
NATO‘s ―lead role‖ within the TSR initially informed the development of the EU‘s ESDP, while 
the latter‘s role was circumscribed by the former‘s—to the chagrin of certain EU member states, 
as described in section three. Thus security competition within the TSR reflects a struggle to 
establish the distribution its various resources, including military assets, political legitimacy and 
primacy, while practical examples of such competition would reflect duplication of efforts or 
discrimination between actors. The case study on MMSC is germane to the general discussion of 
security competition within the TSR because it potentially exhibits a duplication of effort by the 
EU and NATO, which in turn directly relates to ―discrimination‖ or tensions between members 
of the respective organizations.  
 In the case study on regional counter-piracy efforts in the Horn of Africa, the main 
actors‘ success in reducing incidents piracy and the general ―success‖ of various related efforts 
are sporadically asserted but more often seem to be taken as a given. This lack of a clear 
                                                        
15 Oxford English Dictionary, ―Competition,‖ accessed April 8, 2015, 
http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/competition. 
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definition is a problem with the literature because it requires the trust of readers who may have 
little or no prior knowledge of the topic, which devalues the otherwise generally high quality of 
the papers discussed. This thesis will address this problem here by clearly presenting the 
numerical and statistical evolution of regional incidents of piracy in order to clarify and 
operationalize definitions of success.  
 At this point, it is germane to discuss a brief timeline on the evolution of the piracy 
situation in the Horn of Africa region, beginning in May of 2008 with UN Security Council 
(UNSC) resolution 1814. Resolution 1814 authorized member states cooperating with Somalia‘s 
transitional government to enter Somali waters in pursuit of pirates and authorized ―all 
necessary means to repress acts of piracy and armed robbery‖; in June of 2008, this was 
followed by resolution 1816 which granted permission to naval forces to enter Somali territorial 
waters to do the same.16Additional UNSC resolutions including 1846 and 1851, called on both 
member states and regional organizations to combat piracy in Somali territorial waters and on 
land; the authorization for these actions was renewed as recently November 2013.17 These 
resolutions elicited responses from all three of this thesis‘ main actors. NATO was the first to 
respond with the short-term operation Allied Provider in October 2008; this operation would 
transition to NATO‘s ongoing counter-piracy operation Ocean Shield in March 2009.18 The EU 
launched its own naval forces in the region through its ongoing Operation Atalanta in December 
2008; finally, the U.S. Combined Task Force (CTF) 151 was detached from the extant CTF 150, 
whose naval forces were already present in the region in support of U.S. counter-terrorism 
                                                        
16 Oceans Beyond Piracy, ―United Nations Security Council,‖ Oceans Beyond Piracy, 2013, accessed April 
12, 2015, http://oceansbeyondpiracy.org/matrix/united-nations-security-council-unsc. 
17 Security Council Report, ―UN Documents for Piracy – Security Council Resolutions,‖ Security Council 
Report, 2015, accessed April 12, 2015, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un-documents/piracy/ 
18 Carmen Gebhard and Simon J. Smith, ―The Two Faces of EU – NATO Cooperation: Counter-Piracy 
Operations off the Somali Coast,‖ Cooperation and Conflict (2014): 6. 
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operations.19 The exact nature of the interactions between these actors‘ regional counter-piracy 
operations will be explored in greater detail in chapter five of this thesis, but the evolution of 
incidences of piracy during this time frame, from 2008 to the end of 2014, will be discussed 
below. 
From a merely numerical perspective, regional anti-piracy efforts appear to have been 
indisputably successful in that their presence has presided over a total, and for the moment, 
sustained reduction in incidents of piracy. EU NAVFOR‘s regional piracy statistics begin in 
2008, when 24 piracy attacks20 took place in the Horn of Africa; attacks spiked in the three 
following years, rising to 163 in 2009, 174 in 2010, and 176 in 2011. But attacks fell precipitously 
to 35 in 2012 and continued to fall to seven attacks in 2013 and two attacks in 2014. The total 
number of ―successful‖ piracy attacks in the Horn of Africa—those that resulted in ship hijacking 
and/or hostage taking—have fallen from a 2010 peak of 47 to zero successful events in 2014. 
Regional pirates currently hold 26 hostages in captivity, but no longer hold any hijacked 
vessels.21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
19 Gebhard and Smith, ―The Two Faces of EU-NATO Cooperation,‖ 6. 
20 EU NAVFOR‘s total attacks statistic combines all piracy events including attacks that were 
repelled/aborted as well as those that led to the hijacking of ships and the taking hostage of crew 
members. 
21 EU External Action Service, ―Key Facts and Figures: EU Naval Force Somalia - Operation Atalanta,‖ 
European Union External Action Service, March 27, 2015, accessed April 8, 2015, 
http://eunavfor.eu/key-facts-and-figures/. 
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Figure 2 – Evolution of Piracy Incidents in the Horn of Africa Region from 2009-
201422 
Source: European External Action Service, http://eunavfor.eu/key-facts-and-figures/. 
 
Dutch ambassador and former chairman of the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of Somalia 
(CGPCS) Henk Swarttouw supports this definition of success, stating that ―it is hard to argue 
with results. At the time of writing, no commercial ship has been captured since 10 May 2012; 
pirates are holding no merchant ship for ransom; and fewer than 50 hostages remain in 
captivity, all of whom were taken by pirates on or before 26 March 2012.‖23 
 But what are the actual activities that have led to this substantial reduction in incidences 
of regional piracy? Are cooperation and coordination of these activities among the actors on 
which this thesis focuses the cause for the numerical success? And if so, can we deduce that the 
successful reduction in piracy attacks equates to successful cooperation and coordination among 
our concerned actors? While acknowledging the distinction between correlative and causal 
relationships and the possibility of unaccounted for variables, the case study presented in the 
fifth chapter will attempt to isolate possible answers to the questions posed above.  To that end, 
the case study will argue that the concerted efforts of the main actors in the thesis (combined 
                                                        
22 EU External Action Service, ―Key Facts and Figures.‖ 
23 Jon Huggins and Jens Vestergaard Madsen, ―The CGPCS: The Evolution of Multilateralism to Multi-
Stakeholder Collaboration,‖ in Fighting Piracy off the Coast of Somalia: Lessons Learned from the 
Contact Group, ISSUE Report 20, ed. Thierry Tardy (Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies, 2014), 20. 
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with others‘ efforts), particularly the establishment of the Internationally Recommended Transit 
Corridor (IRTC) and its management via the SHADE mechanism are at least partially 
responsible for the sharp decline in regional incidences of piracy.
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CHAPTER THREE: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
 In chapter five, the thesis case study of counter-piracy operations in the Horn of Africa 
will isolate three key actors in the TSR: the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, and the United States of America. The disparate nature of these three actors—the 
fact that the first is a sui generis supranational regional organization, that the second is a 
regional collective security organization, and that the third is a unitary state actor—presents 
conceptual difficulties, as each type of actor traditionally occupies distinct roles within theories 
of international relations. After examining the evolving relationship between these actors, this 
thesis will examine their respective counter-piracy operations on two levels: first, at the macro 
or politico-institutional level relationships between them and second, the ways in which this 
level impacts the micro or operational level, including the need to develop informal cooperative 
and coordinative channels. 
 
3.1  Theories: International Regimes, Hegemony, Offshore Balancing 
In order to tackle the subject matter at the politico-institutional level, this thesis will rely 
primarily upon neo-realist and occasionally neo-liberal conceptions of international relations 
(IR), thereby encompassing both the possibility of relative and absolute gains and the 
importance both of state actors and international organizations and institutions. The concept of 
international regimes, defined by Stephen Krasner as the ―explicit principles, norms, rules and 
decision-making procedures around which actors‘ expectations converge in a given area of 
international relations,‖ will be central to the attempt to understand EU, NATO, and U.S. roles 
in the Horn of Africa and to explain the interactions between them within this theatre of 
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operations.24. Complementary IR theories and concepts include hegemonic stability theory and 
―offshore balancing‖; these will allow us to conceptualize and identify the presence of a hegemon 
within the sphere of transatlantic security, to determine whether hegemonic behavior is 
apparent in the Horn of Africa, and analyze the motivations behind and consequences of such 
behavior. 
The combination of these theoretical tools and heuristics should provide the thesis with 
the necessary firepower to gain a more complete understanding of how the TSR has evolved to 
its current iteration, as well as how individual nation states, supranational entities, and 
international security organizations might contrive to cooperate in the absence a shared, 
uniform security mandate at the politico-institutional and operational levels.  
 
3.2  International Regime Theory (IRT) 
Formally, a regime is the ―implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-
making procedures around which actors‘ expectations converge.‖25  Krasner further clarifies 
these constituent parts as follows: ―Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms 
are standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific 
prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices 
for making and implementing collective choice.‖26   
In reality, a regime exists wherever discrete agents or actors cooperate; they can be both 
formal and informal, and can include institutions as well as organizations. This thesis asserts the 
continued existence of a transatlantic security regime at both informal and formal levels. The 
informal aspect of this regime will be referred to as the ―transatlantic security consensus,‖ 
                                                        
24 Stephen D. Krasner, ―Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening Variables,‖ 
International Organization 36, no. 2 (1982). 
25 Krasner, ―Structural Causes and Regime Consequences.‖ 
26 Ibid., 186. 
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through which the United States and its partners across the Atlantic Ocean (and the 
Mediterranean Sea) shared the common vision of Western style democracy and the liberty to 
choose some form of mixed market capitalism. This informal aspect of the TSR is perhaps best 
captured by regime theory‘s preoccupation with the convergence of principles among the main 
actors in this thesis. These actors formalized their determination to uphold this vision through 
the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which assured regional collective security 
throughout the Cold War. The formalized aspects of the regime, through the creation of NATO, 
cover Krasner‘s other three prescriptions for what constitute regimes: norm-derived rights and 
obligations, rules prescribing actions, and decision-making procedures were all codified in the 
North Atlantic Treaty signed in Washington, D.C. in April 1949.27  Implicit in the informal and 
formal aspects of this TSR was the role of the United States of America as the ultimate guarantor 
of Western European security and liberty, as well at its primacy within the arrangement.28   
The regime was not without its discontents on the European continent; France‘s 
dedication to its own defensive autonomy under President Charles De Gaulle led to its exit from 
NATO‘s integrated command. However, for the duration of the Cold War and up to the end of 
the 20th century, the TSR was remarkably stable. According to Krasner‘s conception of regimes, 
this stability can be attributed to the capacity of the agreed-upon principles, rules, norms, and 
procedures to facilitate further agreement on long-term cooperation as opposed to the constant 
competitive balancing and zero-sum power maximization behavior that states are predicted to 
exhibit in a context of pure international anarchy.29  
Andreas Hasenclever, whose work seeks to synthesize different grand theory approaches 
to international regimes, posits that they are: 
                                                        
27 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The North Atlantic Treaty (Washington, D.C.: NATO, April 4, 
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a major type of international institution… deliberately constructed, partial international 
orders on either  a regional or a global scale, which are intended to remove specific issue-
areas of international politics from the sphere of self-help behavior. By creating shared 
expectations about appropriate behaviour and by upgrading the level of transparency in 
the issue-area, regimes help states (and other actors) to cooperate with a view to reaping 
joint gains in the form of additional welfare or security.30 
 
These characteristics seem to fit the behavior of NATO and its constituent members through to 
the end of the Cold War. But in addition to fulfilling what could be considered the surface level 
requirements necessary to consider to some sort of ideal type international regime, Hasenclever 
notes that the literature has come to scrutinize the concept more closely, leading scholars to ask 
not only whether regimes are in existence, but if they are effective predictors of the pertinent 
actors‘ behavior, and furthermore, how robust such regimes are to ―exogenous shocks or 
challenges in the issue area or beyond.‖ The end of the Cold War is the quintessential example of 
an exogenous shock to the TSR and an existential challenge to the purpose of NATO within the 
TSR.  
This thesis posits the continual existence of a TSR since the formal establishment of 
NATO subsequent to the final ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty in August 1949.31 
However, it is clear that the regime has evolved over time; in addition to welcoming a variety of 
new members and the exit and re-entry of France from integrated command, NATO has 
expanded to ―out-of-area‖ operations beyond its traditional mandate of direct collective 
transatlantic security.32 But even as NATO has welcomed new members, so has the TSR 
expanded to accommodate a new institutional actor in the form of the European Union and its 
nascent security and defense capacities. According to Krasner, regimes can sustain changes 
                                                        
30 Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, ―Integrating Theories of International 
Regimes,‖ Review of International Studies 26, no. 1 (2000). 
31 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, The North Atlantic Treaty.  
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provided the principles and norms, which are the ―basic defining characteristic of a regime.‖33 
Furthermore, he argues that a change of rules or decision-making procedures would not in itself 
bring about an end to the regime provided the change did not contravene the said principles and 
norms.34  If one accepts the conceit that the fundamental principle of the TSR‘s formal 
manifestation in NATO is that of collective defense, as enshrined by article five of the North 
Atlantic Treaty, then it would seem that the regime remains intact despite internal and external 
evolutions.35  However, the European Union‘s Treaty of Lisbon also established a principle of 
mutual defense for its Member States; while this was done without prejudice to NATO and 
Member States with concomitant membership, this change does introduce the possibility of a 
shifting balance within the TSR that is not provided for by the theoretical conceptions of 
Krasner and others.36  
This evolution begs the question: which actors have been the primary drivers of the EU‘s 
and of NATO‘s development, and what has sustained the latter‘s existence following the end of 
the Cold War? The section below will discuss complementary theories that allow us to 
conceptualize the role of key actors, or hegemons, within international regimes. 
 
3.3  Hegemonic Stability Theory 
One textbook definition of Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST) states that: ―hegemony 
provides some order similar to a central government in the international system: reducing 
anarchy, deterring aggression, promoting free trade… When one state‘s power dominates the 
world, that state can enforce rules and norms unilaterally, avoiding the collective goods 
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34 Ibid. 
35 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, ―Collective Defence,‖ North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 
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36 Europa Glossary, ―Mutual defence clause,‖ European Union, accessed April 12, 2015, 
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problem.‖37 Hasenclever positions hegemonic stability theory within the neo-realist approach to 
understanding international regimes, and states that neo-realist scholars like Stephen Krasner 
interpret ―...regimes as international public goods that are in short supply unless a dominant 
actor (or hegemon) takes the lead in their provision and enforcement.‖38 This thesis will rely on 
HST to conceptualize the anchoring role the U.S. has played in maintaining and sustaining the 
TSR following the end of the Cold War and the gradual rise of the EU ESDP/CSDP as potential 
rival to NATO, which this thesis considers has historically been the primary vector of U.S. 
regional security hegemony. However, it will also argue that while seeking to maintain NATO‘s 
and its own primacy, the U.S. foreign policy-making sphere has gradually grown to recognize the 
need to increasingly share or shift burdens to other actors within the TSR.  
While both neo-realist and neo-liberal theorists accept a world beset by anarchy, the 
former school has been reproached for its single-minded focus on the importance of unitary 
states‘ behavior, while the latter stresses the importance of international organizations (IOs) and 
institutions as actors capable of influencing global power dynamics independently of state 
power. However, hegemony as a means by which to structure and shape behavior between states 
nevertheless requires a mechanism or mechanisms by which to do so, and neo-realism does 
encompass states‘ use of institutions to further their own interests. Theorists Kenneth Abbott 
and Duncan Snidal thus observe that: ―The United States, at the peak of its hegemony, 
sponsored numerous IOs, including GATT, IMF, and NATO; these organizations have provided 
‗continuing utility… for regime rule and creation.‘‘39 In the context of Cold War bipolarity, the 
United States was the sole actor in the transatlantic sphere capable of providing the ―public 
good‖ of regional security; by bearing the tangible and intangible costs of establishing and 
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maintaining the TSR, it also gained the right to impose its rules and structures via NATO. In the 
abstract, the imposition of hegemony within a regime along the lines of the security-economic 
interdependence nexus as described by Layne could free willing participants—such as NATO 
members—to focus on absolute or long term gains as opposed to the relative or short term gains 
predicted by the neo-realist conception of anarchy in international relations.40 NATO allowed 
European member states to focus on long term goals and absolute gains, which for many 
entailed the construction of the project that would become the EU, it also served as a vector for 
US primacy as it consolidated and projected military power to attain its security goals—namely 
containment of the U.S.S.R. But the disappearance of this threat has fundamentally changed the 
calculus for all actors implicated in the TSR, especially concerning their perspectives on U.S. 
hegemony. With the absence of the threat removed, the EU has become a more assertive 
security actor in its own right, while the U.S. position on European security, the primacy of 
NATO, and its role as the most militarily capable guarantor of both of these has also evolved. 
The implications of these evolutions will be discussed here below and in the following chapter. 
 
3.4  Offshore Balancing 
Many notable contemporary IR theorists, among them Stephen Walt, describe such 
purposeful attempts to encourage U.S. allies to take greater responsibility for their own security 
interests as ―offshore balancing.‖ Christopher Layne developed the concept in the late 1990s as 
an ―alternative grand strategy‖ by which the United States of America could increase its own 
security and relative power in the international system by backing away from its role grounded 
in a ―preponderance‖ of power (hegemony) and encouraging favored partners to take on 
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increasing burdens.41 Thus, offshore balancing provides a sort of coda to HST and to the U.S. 
hegemonic role.  
As previously described, hegemony entails benefits and costs both for the hegemon itself 
but also for those that exist within the order it has established. The TSR‘s European participants 
were reasonably content to free ride on U.S.-guaranteed collective security against the Soviet 
threat for the duration of the Cold War while paying the price of constrained autonomy—
particularly in the historically sovereign realms of security and defense. If the Cold War‘s end 
amounted to Hasenclever‘s exogenous shock to the regime‘s intended purpose, then what 
impact should this have on the TSR and its hegemonic dynamic? In the neo-realist paradigm, 
the removal of the threat that made the hegemonically-moderated TSR viable and logically 
entails a re-evaluation of the regime‘s power dynamic. Layne writes that, ―simply put, the 
response to hegemony is the emergence of countervailing power.... when too much power is 
concentrated in the hands of one state, others invariably fear for their own security.‖42 He offers 
numerous instances of hegemonic moments—and their respective ends—from European history, 
from the Habsburg Empire to Napoleon through to Hitler‘s defeat in World War II. The 
implication is clear: absent an external threat, states tend to balance against the hegemon.  In 
the absence of the Soviet threat, European members of the TSR should at the very least 
reconsider the constraints they had previously tolerated as well as the inordinate concentration 
of military capacity in the hands of the U.S. and in the U.S. vector of European influence, NATO. 
Layne argues that through hubris or a sense of exceptionalism as a ―benign hegemon,‖ 
the U.S. ignored the lessons of history and continued to pursue its Cold War-era strategy of a 
preponderance of power through the end of the 1990s.43 Furthermore, its dedication to retaining 
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―the pre-eminent responsibility for selectively addressing those wrongs which threaten not only 
our interests but those of our allies or friends, which could seriously unsettle international 
relations‖—without necessarily consulting those allies or friends—led it to strategically 
overextend its power. 44 Layne‘s example of U.S. strategic overreach most pertinent to this thesis 
is the Clinton administration‘s decision to intervene in Bosnia, which he argues was as much if 
not more directed at re-establishing ―NATO‘s credibility‖ than addressing humanitarian 
concerns. Layne cites fellow theorist Robert Art‘s argument that, ―...Absent continued U.S. 
involvement in European security matters… NATO would be unable to perform its post-Cold 
War tasks of maintaining a benign security order conducive to Western Europe‘s continuing 
politico-economic integration, containing resurgent German power, and preventing the West 
European states from renationalizing their policies.‖45 For Layne, continued U.S. insistence on 
addressing peripheral security threats to reassure core members of the TSR could only beget 
further and further strategic overextension.46  
Layne insists that strategic overextension is not inevitable, arguing ―...offshore balancing 
will become the obvious successor to primacy because it is a grand strategic escape hatch by 
which the United States can avoid the fate that has befallen previous hegemons in history.‖47 
The strategy prioritizes burden shifting over burden sharing by encouraging other states to take 
full responsibility for their own security and for regional stability.48 Fellow neo-realist Stephen 
Walt summarizes the concept thusly: ―It [offshore balancing] husbands the power on which U.S. 
primacy depends and minimizes the fear that U.S. power provokes. By setting clear priorities 
and emphasizing reliance on regional allies, it reduces the danger of being drawn into 
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unnecessary conflicts and encourages other states to do more to help us… But it is not a passive 
strategy, and does not preclude using the full range of U.S. power to advance core American 
interests.‖49 
As with many theories—and as critics have not hesitated to point out the concept of 
offshore balancing works much better in a vacuum then in the reality of international 
relations.50 However, this thesis will argue that several aspects of the U.S. foreign policy 
evolution from the late 1990s onward, and particularly its eventual acceptance of the EU as 
security actor in its own right, reflect several tenets of offshore balancing as it has been 
described by Christopher Layne and other of its proponents. In addition to accepting and 
eventually supporting the EU‘s Common Security and Defense Policy (ESDP/CSDP), these 
include the tacit recognition multipolarity and thus of regional powers, material support for 
regional actors in resolving situations that are not of core interest. The following quote by 
President Barack Obama reflects a shifting U.S. foreign policy attitude towards European 
defense in this regard: ―We're looking to be partners with Europe. And the more capable they 
are defensively, the more we can act in concert on the shared challenges that we face.‖51 
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CHAPTER FOUR: FRAMING THE TRANSATLANTIC SECURITY REGIME’S 
EVOLUTION IN THE SHADOW OF U.S. HEGEMONY
4.1  The Role of the U.S.: Transition from the Unipolar Moment to Multipolarity 
and Multilateralism 
If the end of the Cold War brought a swift end to the bipolar world that it had wrought in 
Europe and elsewhere, the disappearance of the Soviet threat that spurred the establishment of 
the TSR curiously did not lead to NATO‘s dissolution. But the change did create a vacuum that 
fundamentally, if temporarily, transformed the global balance of power; Christopher Layne 
argues that ―the Soviet Union‘s collapse elevated the United States to a historically 
unprecedented position of primacy in international politics.‖52 The U.S. consolidation of power 
was swift and, at least in the TSR itself, largely unquestioned and unchallenged— leading to 
what has been referred to as its ―unipolar‖ moment.53 But if ever such unipolarity truly existed, it 
was not long for the world at large. The emergence of regional players the likes of China, India, 
Brazil and even an independent Russia, along with increasing global instability caused by failed, 
rogue, and non-state actors augured the rise of a new era of multipolarity in which U.S. global 
hegemony would be challenged. By the end of the 1990s, it seemed that the unipolar moment 
had passed even in Europe: NATO, as vector of U.S. regional security hegemony, would be 
affected by the inception of an EU military competence. Although certain EU member states, 
namely France, had long (and unsuccessfully) sought the development of a European military 
capacity outside the NATO framework, dissatisfaction with the West‘s handling of the Balkan 
conflicts seems to have crystallized consensus on the need for some form of European defense 
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among the major EU member states.54 Although the concept of an eventual European defense 
was mooted in 1990, the substantive evolution of the EU‘s security and defense competence via 
its European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP, now CSDP) began in 1999.55  
In keeping with its hegemonic prerogative in shaping the institutional contours of the 
TSR, U.S. foreign policy under the second Clinton administration drew lines limiting the ESDP‘s 
purview within the regime, making clear the EU‘s junior partner status vis-à-vis NATO. 
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright articulated the U.S. position around ―...the doctrine of the 
‗three Ds‘ – no decoupling, no discrimination of non-EU allies and no duplication of NATO.‖56 
But despite its insistence on a constrained role, the U.S. ultimately accepted the principle that 
the TSR would have room for a new security actor. EU security researcher Catherine Gegout 
underlines the U.S. supervision of the process, stating that ―...it clearly played a role in the 
making of ESDP institutional structures and in the creation of ESDP missions and could hardly 
have done otherwise; since the debate on the future of ESDP is so closely linked to the role of 
NATO in the world.‖57 Using Layne‘s frame of offshore balancing, U.S. involvement and 
qualified support for the ESDP can be interpreted as a strategic decision to shape allied capacity 
building in view of medium and long term burden sharing or shifting. This interpretation seems 
confirmed by other scholars‘ observations that the U.S. position on the ESDP/CSDP has evolved 
considerably from cautious ambiguity; for example, Marcin Zaborowski from the Polish 
Institute of International Affairs writes that ―The US also welcomed a stronger CSDP… it is now 
expected that, if presented with a unified EU position, the US would drop its opposition of an 
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EU civilian-military HQ, which it objected to in the past.‖58 And despite the ESDP/CSDP‘s often 
halting progression, it has indisputably grown beyond its initial scope. Its evolution will be 
examined from a more Euro-centric perspective below. 
 
4.2  Interorganizational Relations and Competition between the EU and NATO 
 
4.2.1  Rise of EU as Security Actor  
While the 1992 Treaty on European Union made allusion to the development of 
European defense within its Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) via the Western 
European Union (WEU), this complementary organization was understood to be ―‗a means to 
strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance…‘‖ and thus firmly within the NATO 
framework.59 However, the 1998 St. Malo agreement saw the first major step towards a 
substantive collectivization of security and defense preferences at the European level; these have 
since become enshrined in its European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP, but now called the 
Common Security and Defense Policy or CSDP). Gegout presents this moment as a shift during 
which EU Member states either ―...accepted or refused certain links with NATO and succeeded 
in reaching EU common policies…‖60 She also identifies Germany, the UK, and France as the 
primary actors within the CFSP/CSDP, but in keeping with information from an interview, 
suggests that France and the United Kingdom are ―the motor of the negotiation‖ and 
presumably thus the main setters of EU‘s security and defense agenda because of their 
significant disagreements and respective statures as major security players beyond the 
European sphere, as nuclear powers and members of the UN Security Council.61 Both actors 
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made concessions towards each other‘s preferences, with a ―French rapprochement‖ with (and 
eventual re-integration into) NATO and a British reversal on its previous opposition to 
European defensive capacities external to NATO. Their aggregation of preferences culminated in 
1998‘s St. Malo declaration, which proclaimed: ―The European Union will also need to have 
recourse to suitable military means (European capabilities pre-designated within NATO‘s 
European pillar or national or multinational European means outside the NATO framework).‖62 
However, the establishment of such ‗means outside the NATO framework‘ nevertheless hinged 
on their use being secondary to NATO. According to Gegout, ―...there would be no duplication, 
and NATO would remain the essential security and defence structure…‖; most importantly, 
NATO was granted first right of refusal for any undertaking that might fall within its purview, as 
the ―EU would intervene only where NATO as a whole was not engaged.‖63 
 
4.2.2  Evolution to Berlin Plus → Framework for EU-NATO Cooperation 
Gegout references the Europeanists‘ (and France in particular) initial strident resistance 
to this NATO-centric orientation of EU defense, but it appears that this resistance at least briefly 
softened following the St. Malo Declaration; meanwhile, the U.S. made no overt move to oppose 
the ESDP‘s continued development.64  The member states of NATO had already pledged their à 
priori support for the European Security Identity at the 1996 NATO ministerial meeting in 
Berlin; they also agreed in principle to eventual ESDI access to and use of certain NATO 
resources.65 This initial Berlin arrangement was followed by the Berlin Plus agreement signed in 
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2003, which spelled out the grand axes of EU-NATO interaction. According to Natalia 
Touzovskaia, these 2003 Berlin Plus agreements were very similar to the original in the way they 
articulate EU access to NATO assets, planning, command structures, consulting and other 
capabilities. However, one significant advance established official, formal channels by which the 
EU could access NATO intelligence via a classified information exchange.66  
The 2003 Berlin Plus agreement facilitated inter-organizational cooperation between the 
EU and NATO in two operations: Concordia (EU takeover of NATO stabilization mission in 
FYROM 2003) and Althea (taking over NATO‘s stabilization mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
by EUFOR). Both missions were relatively successful, allowing the EU to develop capacity in a 
low-risk zone due to ongoing NATO presence, but freeing NATO/US resources for use in Iraq 
and Afghanistan.67 While the Berlin Plus arrangements provide a framework through which the 
EU was able to take on the mantle of NATO‘s peacekeeping operations in the Balkans, a seeming 
lack of foresight on the part of its architects has made this framework politically unworkable due 
to tensions between EU and NATO member states. This situation will be referred to as the 
Participation Problem, and is seen as a substantial lever by which certain member states of the 
respective organizations block the very channels that were designed to facilitate their 
cooperation, particularly via the essential mechanism of informational exchange. The 
implications of the Participation Problem will be discussed in greater detail in the subsequent 
section on EU-NATO relations and addressed again for its implications in maritime security 
cooperation between these actors. 
 Regardless of the obstacles to Berlin Plus, Gegout points out that France continued to 
push for missions that, unlike Concordia and Althea, could be undertaken entirely 
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independently of NATO in order to assert the EU‘s identity as an independent security actor and 
shore up this ambition with actual capacity building.68 But despite the fact that 10 of its 11 
ongoing or completed military missions have been conducted without direct NATO assistance 
(excepting NATO air transport for EU troops supporting the African Union‘s mission in Darfur), 
Gegout references doubts about the actual scope and potential for ESDP/CSDP efforts for 
operations of consequence absent U.S. and/or NATO support.69 She specifically highlights the 
skepticism of high-level British and French officials vis-à-vis the ESDP on its theoretical and 
proven capacities. She quotes UK Defence Secretary Geoff Hoon‘s observation that UK 
involvement in ―large-scale combat operations without the United States‖ was ―highly unlikely‖ 
before noting French General Neveux‘s speculation that the EU‘s uniform position on its first 
non-Berlin Plus military mission (Artemis) would have been significantly less so ―if the risks had 
been greater, the stakes more sensitive, the contributions more numerous, and the engagement 
on the ground more important‖.70 The allusions to the breakdown of Berlin Plus will be revisited 
below, but if such feelings are held at the highest levels of French and British defense—the two 
major drivers of EU defense–this sentiment may explain ESDP/CSDP‘s perceived lack of 
ambition. Meanwhile, NATO‘s concomitant evolution has been controversial and arguably far 
from unambitious.  
 
4.2.3  NATO’s post-Cold War Transformation: Security beyond the TSR’s Horizon?  
 As previously discussed, neorealist theory predicts that alliances form and cohere around 
the presence of threats; the disappearance of such threats should logically usher in the 
dissolution or degradation of the alliance developed to defend against it. But while many realist 
theories foresaw ―...the imminent demise of NATO following the end of the Cold War…‖, 
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scholars Menon and Welsh present the counterbalancing Institutionalist theories of 
organizational persistence such as path dependence, wherein the sunk costs associated with the 
creation of NATO or like institutions, as well as NATO‘s own institutional character prevent its 
disappearance. 71 However, the authors dispute both accounts in part or in whole, arguing that 
NATO has undergone substantive and substantial organizational transformations since those 
early predictions of impending obsolescence: ―In operational terms, the alliance has evolved 
from the defense of particular states and values, to a range of risk management and 
transformation tasks that include counterterrorism, the promotion of good governance, and the 
direct provision of aid to civilian populations.‖72 If such changes indicate NATO‘s ability to adapt 
rather than wither away as a relic of a previous era, they do not necessarily mean that all its 
member states are pleased with the organization‘s chosen path of evolution. 
While NATO‘s embrace of tasks beyond its historical remit may well be indicative of 
institutional change, these tasks relate to its most radical transformation: the extension of its 
mandate to out of area operations. Its first major out of area operation, the recently completed 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan, has been recognized 
within and without NATO as a ―critical test for the Alliance‖ that ―demonstrates a broad 
recognition that threats to the Euro-Atlantic area must at times be confronted well outside of 
our region.‖73 But if undertaking such out-of-area operations gives new life to NATO‘s reasons 
for existence—primarily by making it a global security actor— many scholars have underlined 
that this direction belies the divergent interests of NATO‘s member states. Menon and Welsh 
suggest that internal divisions among member states may ultimately undermine its ability to 
fulfill its evolving role: 
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Consensus on institutional roles and functions ultimately depends on agreement among 
member states; the effort to adopt new roles—while hailed by many as evidence of 
NATO‘s vitality— may not engender universal support. The resulting distributional 
conflict can undermine institutional performance, and ultimately the future prospect for 
collective action, via the incentives it provides member states to free ride. In the current 
context, conflict within NATO could significantly reduce the likelihood that alliance 
members would agree to expansive out of operations in the future.74 
 
The removal of the common Soviet threat and the perceptions of the world‘s increasing 
multipolarity among the citizenry in NATO‘s member states seem to have reinforced these 
diverging interests on NATO‘s use of force via the pressure of public opinion.75 The ensuing 
‗distributional conflict‘ on NATO‘s proper role has spilled over into its operational realities and 
highlighted historical and current imbalances between the material commitments of various 
member states.  
 Concerns about imbalances in burden sharing among NATO member states are not new; 
U.S. Army Colonel Patrick Warren points out that the U.S. provided ―over 50  percent of NATO‘s 
military capabilities‖ during its first six decades.76 Such an inequitable distribution was perhaps 
not surprising in the context of U.S. regional security hegemony within the TSR and during the 
bipolar Cold War. But consistent with the predictions of offshore balancing, the U.S. has made 
clear its desire for other members to more equitably shoulder the burdens of a globalized NATO 
in a multipolar world.77 Warren notes that unequal burden sharing was particularly poignant 
during NATO‘s first major out-of-area operations in Afghanistan, observing that 68 percent of 
NATO member states did not meet their troop commitment obligations for ISAF, leaving the 
other 28 percent to shoulder the burden unequally; the UK, U.S., Netherlands and Canada 
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accounted for over 80 percent of deaths.78 Such losses are understandably difficult to explain to 
domestic constituencies in NATO member states, but they also indicate that the historical trend 
of members‘ free-riding on major players like the U.S. and the UK will continue and possibly 
grow even more exaggerated.  
In light of Gegout‘s earlier observations on the disparity between the ESDP/CSDP‘s 
ambitions and capacities, it seems that even an autonomous EU defense mechanism must rely 
on NATO‘s superior capabilities, thereby continuing the trend of free riding at the 
interorganizational level within the TSR. However, Colonel Warren presents the EU‘s emergence 
within the TSR in adversarial terms, declaring that ―...today, there is perhaps no more vivid 
manifestation of the challenges caused by ‗diverging interests‘ than the ascendency of the 
European Union as a competing collective security alliance.‖79 We will now examine how the 
relationship between the two actors has evolved in practice.  
 
4.2.4  EU-NATO Relations 
 Although NATO‘s persistence, albeit challenged, may be more nuanced than the 
explanations that Menon and Welsh critique, others have noted its organizational resistance to 
the EU‘s growing role in the TSR via the ESDP/CSDP and the difficult adjustment period that 
has characterized relations between these two institutional actors. Marcin Zaborowski describes 
NATO‘s feelings towards the EU‘s security role as unwelcoming:  
Ever since the emergence of the EU‘s European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) in 
1999, the EU-NATO relationships has been problematic… The creation of ESDP was 
never welcomed by NATO, which perceived it as competition and argued that it could 
lead to an unnecessary duplication of the member states‘ resources. Those NATO 
members that are not EU Members (non-EU NATO allies) were worried that they might 
suffer discrimination.80  
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Gegout reinforces the ambiguous dynamic, noting that:   
 
ESDP changes the balance in the EU-NATO relation. NATO is no longer the only 
organization in which the future of the defence and security of Europe is discussed. 
However, NATO capabilities are much more substantial than EU capabilities. This can 
make the EU dependent on NATO for missions, which require effective strategic lift 
capabilities, intelligence, and strategic command.81 
 
The dissonance between the ESDP/CSDP‘s stated ambitions and actual capacities indicates its 
potential need to rely on NATO, an organization that has been described as less than thrilled by 
the emergence of an upstart actor whose mandate logically overlaps with its own. Zaborowski 
supports this description, presenting NATO‘s institutional feelings towards the ESDP as reticent 
at best. Gegout underscores the reasons for NATO‘s hesitation by acknowledging that the EU‘s 
emergence as a security actor—albeit one with a great potential reliance on NATO—within the 
TSR inevitably reduces NATO‘s primacy as its previous sole organizational actor.  
Given the initial ambiguity of this co-habitation, it should not be surprising that 
apparent inter-organizational tensions could be construed as competition between the two 
actors. Chapter two framed security competition within the TSR as efforts by the EU and NATO 
to maximize their respective shares of finite resources within the regime, including military 
assets, political legitimacy and primacy; it also suggested that practical examples of such 
competition could manifest themselves through duplication of effort or discrimination between 
the member states of the respective organizations. In the sense of actors seeking to maximize 
their share of legitimacy (and primacy) within the TSR, the seeds of EU – NATO competition 
could be traced to NATO‘s first consequential missions in post-Cold War Europe, namely its 
interventions in the Balkan conflicts. Although instability in the Balkans can be considered a 
threat to the security of the European members of the Alliance, the interventions themselves 
represent an extension of the logic of collective defense vis-à-vis a common threat like the 
U.S.S.R. towards the provision of security and stability. 
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Gegout, among others, point to European dissatisfaction with NATO‘s response as the 
tipping point for consolidating EU-level consensus on the creation of the ESDP.82  As discussed, 
initially the U.S. and NATO only consented to attributing specific tasks (Petersberg) to the 
ESDP, and in very specific circumstances at that (when NATO was as a whole was not 
engaged).83 With NATO‘s continued primacy taken as a given, potential competition over the 
legitimacy of the respective actors should have been precluded by such a clear delineation of 
tasks. Logically, this meant that NATO, while remaining the original collective defense 
organization, could expand its role as an out-of-area ―exporter‖ of security. The EU, in turn, 
could build specific capacities, namely in humanitarian and peacekeeping missions, to serve as a 
secondary regional security actor in theaters where all NATO members were not interested in 
intervening. The question of competition over resources was also settled, in theory, by the 2003 
Berlin Plus framework by which the EU would have access to NATO assets and planning 
structures in such cases. In 2003, it must have seemed that despite uncertain feelings between 
the EU and NATO, the institutional framework that had just been signed should prevent 
competition between the two actors. However, it would seem little provision was made for 
eventuality that Berlin Plus may exhibit certain flaws in design. These flaws and their ability to 
generate competition within the TSR will be discussed below. 
 
4.2.5  Communications Breakdown: The Participation Problem 
Although 2003‘s Berlin Plus agreement seemed to pave the way to clear channels of 
interorganizational cooperation that would overcome potential tensions, these channels only 
resulted in two EU-NATO cooperative missions. Fears surrounding the EU and NATO‘s 
potential inability to work well together—developments that could undermine Madeleine 
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Albright‘s ―3 D‘s‖ doctrine of no decoupling, no duplication and no discrimination—seem to 
have been at least partially confirmed by the advent of the ―Participation Problem.‖ The 
Participation Problem refers to the imposition of obstacles to the sort of streamlined inter-
organizational cooperation between the EU and NATO that was intended by the Berlin Plus 
agreement. According to Zaborowski, these obstacles were engendered by Cyprus‘ 2004 
accession to the EU and the fact that it has ―normal relations with NATO… and is involved in a 
bitter dispute with Ankara…‖; the lack of dialogue between Cyprus and Turkey has in effect 
jammed the formal cooperative channels ―...in the existing NATO-EU frameworks as long as 
Cyprus is present…‖.84  While NATO does maintain relationships with non-member states, 
Simon Smith points out that there is no formal provision for cooperation with countries that are 
not part of the ―Partnership for Peace‖ (PfP), of which Cyprus is not a member.85  According to 
Smith, Turkey, as a NATO member, has blocked Cyprus‘ accession to the PfP; in turn, EU 
member state Cyprus exercises its prerogative ―to ensure that no matters outside of Berlin Plus 
are discussed at the NAC-PSC level,‖ which is to say NATO‘s North Atlantic Council and the 
EU‘s Political and Security Council.86  These two organisms host the highest level of member 
state political representation involved in cooperative decision-making in their respective 
organizations, and met regularly until Cyprus‘ accession to the EU in 2004—since which time 
―no formal ministerial meetings have taken place.‖87  
 In Smith‘s view, the Participation Problem has ―resulted in Berlin Plus becoming 
effectively a straitjacket for EU-NATO cooperation‖; practically speaking, this has created 
situations in which the ―EU and NATO have personnel in common mission areas (Afghanistan & 
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Kosovo) without the formal tools to discuss cooperation in what are, especially with regard to 
Afghanistan, volatile areas.‖88  Indeed, the Participation Problem has wide ranging effects on 
relationships within the TSR, specifically limiting the nature of EU and NATO security 
cooperation. Its general impact on EU – NATO cooperation will be discussed in the case study 
below before examining how this status quo conditioned the specific modalities of inter-
organizational relations in the Horn of Africa region. The implications of the Participation 
Problem for EU-NATO cooperation in addressing piracy in the Horn of Africa have been 
negative and consequential for both the high politics of security cooperation and the crux of 
operational modalities between allied actors incapable of directly exchanging information via 
established channels. However, attempts by various actors within the TSR, notably the U.S., 
have attempted to address the Participation Problem through the establishment and use of 
informal channels.
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CHAPTER FIVE: MARITIME SECURITY CASE STUDY
 
It would seem that the EU‘s ESDP/CSDP has experienced some growing pains and a lack 
of self-assuredness concerning its identity, complicated in turn by a complex cohabitation with 
NATO. None of the above complications have prevented the EU from increasing attempts to 
assert itself as a comprehensive regional and extraregional security actor (through civil support 
and police missions in Afghanistan and both civil and military missions in Africa), even if 
aforementioned politico-institutional obstacles, namely the Participation Problem, have 
hampered the EU-NATO interorganizational cooperation intended by the Berlin Plus 
arrangements. This section will examine how these arrangements and blockages have played out 
in the specific case of regional piracy in the Horn of Africa region. What spurred the EU‘s 
decision to develop the ESDP‘s naval capacity, how did NATO and the U.S. react respectively to 
the same problem, and how have the three operations interacted in light of blockages to formal 
cooperation? 
Before examining the particularities of the operations themselves, it is important to note 
various elements of the context in which they are taking place. Due to several unique 
characteristics relating to counter-piracy efforts in the Horn of Africa region, addressing piracy 
off the coast of Somalia can be considered as a ―low-risk‖ security situation:  Somali piracy often 
involves poorly organized, poorly equipped independent groups of non-state actors who receive 
no support from the internationally recognized Federal Government of Somalia. Furthermore, 
Somalia‘s embattled stability and the fact that UN Security Council resolutions ―have authorized 
force in the country‘s waters and on land‖ legitimize Western efforts considerably diminish the 
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threat of any potential diplomatic blowback from it or other countries.89 Indeed, Western 
security actors have been joined by other extraregional actors, China and India among them. 
Finally, the EU‘s contribution to these efforts via its Operation Atalanta represent the CSDP‘s 
first naval mission, and thus an important move towards developing this capacity within the 
scope of the military missions it is willing and able to undertake. 
 
5.1  Cooperation, Coordination, and Competition at the Politico-institutional Level 
In his study of the evolution of EU-NATO cooperation, Simon Smith develops a typology 
of missions that have involved or could involve cooperation, and what form that cooperation 
takes. According to Smith, there are essentially three types of possible interaction between EU 
and NATO missions/forces. These include official, formalized cooperation via the Berlin Plus 
framework; missions outside that framework with overlap in the same geographical area but 
different purposes or functions; and missions outside of the framework that overlap in terms of 
geographical area and/or function. 90 The EU and NATO‘s activities in the Horn of Africa fall 
within the category of ―...non-agreed framework missions where they are performing similar 
duties in the same operational theatre, but without formal arrangements for cooperation.‖91  
The politico-institutional obstacles can essentially be attributed to diplomatic tensions 
and disagreements between different state actors within the TSR. For the time being, these 
tensions have led to ―‘red lines… relating to the transfer of classified information‖ around which 
forces in the separate EU and NATO operations must adapt themselves in order to achieve some 
level of cooperation and/or coordination at the operational level.92 But while Smith 
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acknowledges that the simultaneous operations in the Horn of Africa have led ―to a certain 
amount of competition,‖ he also suggests that the international diversity of anti-piracy missions 
there have made ―EU-NATO cooperation… more hidden, and therefore, more effective.‖ 93  
In any event, and despite not having access to the formal information sharing channels 
built-in to Berlin Plus framework missions, Smith presents a situation of casual 
interdependence, in which both the EU and NATO personnel work in close proximity directing 
their respective operations from a base in Northwood, England. Both actors, along with the US, 
are equally present at the main operational headquarters in Bahrain.94 Smith describes a 
situation in which ―intelligence (provided mainly by the US) is collected and passed on from 
NATO to the EU,‖ and in which ―…the UK seems to have the ability to ensure that all the various 
forces work together.‖95 He also discusses the speculation that ―some‖ have put forward 
concerning NATO‘s desire to collapse its own Ocean Shield Operation; these same individuals 
seem to suggest that despite the fact that the EU‘s Operation Atalanta is ―better resourced,‖ the 
EU is ―seemingly dependent on NATO and unwilling to see this operation go.‖96 This 
interpretation confirms earlier observations on the EU‘s hesitation to undertake ambitious 
missions without the presence of NATO, regardless of whether the Berlin Plus framework is in 
place. 
Smith and Carmen Gebhard‘s recent revisitation of the subject provides greater depth in 
elucidating the nature of cooperation between the actors concerned in this thesis. Gebhard and 
Smith stridently reaffirm that ―…although the EU‘s operation NAVOR ‗Atalanta‘ and NATO‘s 
‗Ocean Shield‘ operate in the same theatre and with similar mandates, there is no formal link 
                                                        
93 Smith, ―EU - NATO Cooperation,‖ 257. 
94 Which is incidentally the main headquarters of the US-led Combined Task Force 151. 
95 Smith, ―EU - NATO Cooperation,‖ 257. 
96 Ibid. 
 41 
between them97. No joint planning has been envisaged, and no official task-sharing takes 
place.‖98 As in Smith‘s earlier publication, Gebhard and Smith again trace the origin of these 
obstacles to the political and institutional levels, noting that the EU and NATO member states:  
have been unable to agree on the political relationship… in a way that would allow for 
joint operational effort and sound strategic cooperation, let alone for a unity of 
command... No joint planning has been envisaged, neither before nor after any of the 
operations were deployed… Although both organizations have operations in the same 
mission space, no official task-sharing takes place between NATO… and there is no 
intended or formal functional and strategic complementarity of actions.99  
 
Readers are presented with a dichotomy in which institutional and political blockages contrast 
with an operational reality in which diverse maritime security actors, and primarily the EU, 
NATO, and the US, overcome such blockages through purposely informal mechanisms (to be 
discussed subsequently): 
The notion of inter-organizational cooperation… is heavily dominated, if not determined, 
by state interests and national agendas, particularly when it comes to formal 
institutional developments. Pragmatic and informal arrangements in turn seem to 
override the dominating role of state interests, which leads to more flexibility and 
functionality, but does not, in the long run, compensate for the lack of formal 
arrangements nor likely trigger any changes.100 
 
 
5.1.1  MS Exploitation of Politico-institutional Obstacles to Promote Interests via 
Organizations 
At the level of high politics, the Turkey-Cyprus dispute and resultant Participation 
Problem have blocked the cooperative channels established by the Berlin Plus agreement on EU-
NATO cooperation, effectively preventing any efforts coordinated by that framework since 2004. 
These obstacles are reflected by the ―lack of formal links‖ between the two actors‘ respective 
operations in the Horn of Africa, but their impact is even more salient at the operational level. 
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However, it would appear that at the political level, there is more to the story than the Turkey-
Cyprus dispute. Even as those two countries pursue their national claims against each other by 
inflicting collateral damage to the (often overlapping) member states of the respective 
organizations, it would seem that certain other EU member states have exploited the situation to 
advance their own preferences for a more capable and competent ESDP/CSDP. 
Basil Germond and Michael Smith‘s analysis of EU‘s Operation Atalanta presents 
France, under the leadership of President Nicolas Sarkozy, as a the driving force for advancing 
the ESDP generally and the EU‘s non-NATO naval capacities specifically and quote Hervé 
Morin, French Minister of Defence at the time, as saying ―that the EU naval operation is a 
‗marvelous symbol of moves towards a Euro-military and defence policy.‖101 Germond and 
Smith suggest this position was reinforced by Germany as one of the three major EU decision-
makers for security and defense matters: ―the German government clearly felt a domestic 
political preference for an EU option rather than yet another controversial NATO or US-led 
operation.”102 But the UK, the third identified EU security power broker, appears to have 
exhibited its traditional reticence towards enlarging the ESDP/CSDP‘s scope, where ―... a new 
ESDP competence in naval matters would automatically undermine NATO‘s capacities.‖103 
Germond and Smith indicate that the UK ultimately relented because it recognized that ―NATO 
was already becoming too overstretched elsewhere (notably in Afghanistan, and in naval terms 
too, in monitoring potential terrorist activities at sea)...‖; having recognized this, the UK had to 
embrace an ESDP naval competence or risk letting France set its terms by taking the lead.104 
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Germond and Smith also remark upon the presence of a plurality of state and other 
actors involved in regional counter piracy efforts, including our two other subjects of interest, 
the United States navy, via its Combined Task Force 151, and NATO‘s own Operation Ocean 
Shield. Unfortunately, they do not address the fact that the presence of these actors, specifically 
NATO, is inconsistent with their earlier assertion that the UK conceded the advancement of an 
ESDP naval competence via Operation Atalanta because NATO was spread too thin. Nor do they 
substantively address the possibility of competition and/or duplication of effort between the EU, 
NATO, and the US— remarking only that ―...the current multilateral naval structure, bringing 
together a network of national naval forces, naval coalitions, and institutional actors, is still very 
complicated, and active leadership must be exercised to gradually increase the efficiency of the 
operational activities…‖. 
Excepting that lacuna, Germond and Smith generally provide a thorough tableau of the 
context surrounding the decision-making process by which Operation Atalanta answered the 
EU‘s major security actors:  
desire to respond to a common security threat and enhance the EU‘s global role…; the 
process and the outcomes are of institutional and political interest because the operation 
represents... a combination of interest definition, threat perception, and military  power 
projection that has been lacking in every single ESDP operation until Atalanta.105  
 
Colonel Warren‘s analysis corroborates this interpretation, albeit from a clear Atlanticist 
perspective: 
The EU‘s recently acquired responsibility… competes with NATO‘s role as the 
preeminent security provider involves the ongoing counter-piracy operations off the 
coast of Somalia and in the Gulf of Aden… In this instance, both the EU and NATO have 
concurrent and separate operations supporting the counter-piracy task when a joint 
operation would prove more efficient… The EU rebuffed requests from NATO for 
cooperation, presumably to bolster its image as a capable security organization distinct 
from NATO.106 
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Regardless of the perspective, it is clear that such jockeying at the intergovernmental level has 
an effect on the ability of these two organizations to formally cooperate in achieving what, at 
least in this case, are the same objectives: the reduction of piracy in the Horn of Africa region. 
But evidence presented in the coming paragraphs suggests that other actors within the TSR, 
including NATO and EU member states, have contrived to develop informal channels at both the 
political and operational levels, through which NATO and the EU can collaborate more 
effectively due to the depoliticized and multilateral aspects of these channels. 
 
5.1.2  Informal Channels: U.S. Policy Entrepreneurship and the Contact Group 
The paragraphs below detail the informal channels that have been developed specifically 
to facilitate multilateral maritime security cooperation (MMSC) between our actors in the Horn 
of Africa. In fact, several articles on the EU-NATO relationship suggest a longstanding use of 
informal links, pointing to the evolution of an interorganizational culture that adapts to achieve 
operational results even when political cooperation is more complicated. Simon Smith suggests 
that, barring Berlin Plus cooperation (which is the most efficient but the least possible in the 
current politico-institutional context), EU – NATO cooperation is more apparent the further 
away one gets from Brussels; he finds that ―commanders in the field of non-Berlin Plus 
operations do work together despite the lack of official agreements to do so… but purely at the 
informal level.‖107  
Two analyses suggest that U.S. diplomatic efforts have proactively sought to assist the 
EU and NATO in overcoming the obstacles imposed by the current inoperability of the Berlin 
Plus framework.108 In the first instance, Smith recounts the then U.S. Secretary of State 
Condoleezza Rice‘s 2005 implementation of informal meetings known as ―Transatlantic 
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Events‖; the goal of these events was to provide foreign ministers from all EU and NATO 
member states to gather unofficially in order to find  solution to general ‗EU-NATO‘ deadlock.109 
The second attempt also originated with Secretary Rice, but in this case pertains to the case 
study, as it led directly to the establishment of an informal and multilateral mechanism through 
which the counter-piracy efforts undertaken by the EU, NATO, the US and other actors have 
apparently been coordinated.110 This mechanism,  the Contact Group on Piracy off the Coast of 
Somalia (CGPCS), appears to be the locus of cooperation and coordination of the parallel 
operations in the Horn of Africa.  
Although the U.S. and its partners (essentially the EU-3) established the CGPCS 
pursuant to the UN Security Council resolutions (1851 among others) encouraging the 
international community to respond to the threat of Somali piracy, the EU Institute for Security 
Studies Report on the CGPCS repeatedly asserts that the U.S. and its partners purposely did so 
outside of traditional or formal venues (like the UN itself). 111 Instead, they opted for an 
arrangement ―...without a formal process of membership, without a formal strategy, without a 
secretariat, and without a formal decision-making process.‖112 The CGPCS nevertheless includes 
―key international organisations (UN, IMO, INTERPOL, the European Union and NATO)‖ and 
now numbers ―over 60 countries and 20 organizations.‖113 According to former CGPCS 
Chairman Henk Swarttouw, the group‘s model was developed ―approximately along the lines of 
the 2008 [U.S.] National Security Council‘s ‗Countering Piracy Action Plan—Horn of Africa,‘‖ 
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providing direct corroboration for U.S. policy entrepreneurship in addressing the problem of 
regional piracy.114  
The CGPCS‘s model also allowed it to overcome the very essence of the EU-NATO, 
Cyprus-Turkey Participation Problem. By designing an informal venue based on consensus-
based decision-making (essentially the ―silence procedure‖ employed by NATO), and by 
changing the term for stakeholder engagement from ―membership‖ to ―participation,‖ Cyprus 
was allowed to take part in the CGPCS‘ activities—including information exchange.115 While the 
CGPCS‘ complete separation from the formal venues of the TSR has allowed it to overcome the 
Participation Problem, it has itself become further depoliticized thanks to extraregional actors 
who ―have preferred to pretend that it is, because of political disinclination to be seen following 
the lead of what would otherwise look very much like a Western-led coalition; a good example of 
constructive ambiguity.‖116 
In sum, the U.S. embrace of informal multilateralism allowed it to build a dynamic 
structure around which to build an international ―coalition‖ by which to aggressively tackle 
Somali piracy. However, the plurality of actors did not fully mitigate the fact that the ―primary 
burden of counter-piracy operations at sea was being carried by international organisations such 
as the European Union and NATO.‖117 This quote reveals that the CGPCS‘ greatest diplomatic 
success has been its ability to provide a mechanism wherein two organizations that have 
previously come to an agreement to cooperate and coordinate their efforts but rarely do have 
actually managed to overcome the political and institutional blockages that habitually hamstring 
them. The concrete implications of the CGPCS for cooperation and coordination between the EU 
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NAVFOR, NATO, and U.S.-led Combined Task Force 151‘s respective operations will be 
discussed below. 
 
5.2  Overcoming Obstacles to Cooperation and Coordination at the Operational 
Level 
 The purpose of this section is to understand the concrete implications of the breakdown 
of the Berlin Plus framework and how the resulting need to interact outside the established 
channels of formal EU-NATO security cooperation has impacted the operational level for the 
EU, NATO, and U.S. counter-piracy missions in the Horn of Africa. It will argue that the 
inability to exchange information could have severely impacted the ability of these actors‘ 
efficiently realize their objective of reducing regional piracy, and that overcoming such hurdles 
were central to their ability to coordinate their deployed resources via the Shared Awareness and 
Deconfliction mechanism (SHADE). Indeed, SHADE‘s ability to coordinate such efforts in turn 
appears directly related to the informational exchange systems that were developed by the 
different actors specifically for this theater of operations. The combination of the SHADE 
mechanism and information systems facilitated the creation and implementation of the 
Internationally Recognized Transit Corridor (ITRC), which has reduced and continues to reduce 
regional incidences of piracy while minimizing duplication of effort and maximize the impact of 
deployed forces. 
 
 
5.2.1  Impact of Politico-institutional Obstacles on Operational 
Cooperation/Coordination 
Information Sharing 
 Given that the EU‘s access to NATO‘s command and planning structures and military 
assets are clearly off the table outside of the Berlin Plus framework, it is logical that information 
has in many ways become the most critical resource and currency of exchange between the two 
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organizations when interacting outside of the framework. And indeed, even once formal asset 
sharing and shared planning are no longer possible, the ability to exchange information between 
cooperating actors in any theater of operations remains fundamental to their ability to 
coordinate their efforts. Gebhard and Smith support this claim, asserting that ―the passing of 
sensitive information and the exchange of relevant intelligence across organization boundaries 
is in fact the most challenging problem that the EU and NATO have to surmount when 
cooperating in a non-Berlin Plus setting.‖118 Smith notes the EU and NATO‘s inability to 
formally share classified information has manifested itself in the organizations‘ respective 
missions in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Afghanistan, although he notes that the small size of 
the EU‘s Policing Mission in the latter has allowed commanders in the field ―to cooperate in the 
open due to states turning a blind eye…‖119 Concretely, the inability to share information results 
from NATO‘s policy on not sharing classified information with countries with whom it has not 
signed a security agreement; given that NATO assumes that any information it shares with EU 
members will be shared with non-PfP signatory Cyprus, it simply does not share the 
information.120 However, such formal obstacles to information exchange have not always 
prevailed at the operational level, where ―the existing rules are often stretched… out of 
operational necessity.‖121 
 This loose application of the rules would seem to have become the rule itself for counter-
piracy operations in the Horn of Africa. Smith observes that given that inter-organizational 
cooperation there is ―more hidden, red lines concerning the transfer of classified material do not 
necessarily apply… this allows sensitive intelligence to be passed from ship to ship and over the 
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table.‖122 Indeed, this sidestepping of formal obstacles to information exchange appears to have 
become semi-institutionalized in this theater of operations. In this case, the EU took the lead in 
developing an ad hoc policy permitting the unilateral exchange of information—a move followed 
by NATO, which subsequently adopted a similar policy.123 Gebhard and Smith suggest that EU 
decision-makers recognized the critical need for overcoming information exchange obstacles if 
its first naval operation was to prove successful:  
Crucially, this agreement was given consent by the PSC, based on the consideration that 
the absence of such an arrangement would be ‗binding what ―Atalanta‖ could do and 
could not do‘. This EU document has later been mirrored by a NATO agreement on the 
sharing of information.124  
 
But Gebhard and Smith also recall that despite such ad hoc efforts, the overarching formal 
obstruction remains, observing that ―the problem remains that there is no inter-organizational 
arrangement in place for communication, cooperation or command and control‖ and that 
―forces mandated to support one operation and not the other have difficulty sharing intelligence 
between operations‖ 125  
 
Deployment Issues 
It has already been established that the absence of a Berlin Plus-moderated mission 
precludes EU access to NATO assets; as such member states of the respective organizations may 
find it difficult to decide how best to deploy their resources in a situation of overlapping 
operations such as that in the Horn of Africa region. According to Smith, the main difficulty for 
EU and NATO member states is in choosing through which organization and corresponding 
counter-piracy operation to channel their resources. He points out that this issue is especially 
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salient for non-EU countries like Canada and Turkey, who ―have chosen to insert ships into 
NATO‘s Ocean Shield because they will retain full command and control, unlike if they were to 
deploy in Atalanta.‖126 However, the difficulty in deciding is perhaps more poignant still for 
countries with overlapping memberships in both organization. 
 
A Potential Context for Operational Competition 
Gebhard and Smith thus describe a situation in which a ―model case for EU-NATO task-
sharing and complementarity‖ risked turning into what is arguably a ―prime example of strategic 
overlap and, potentially, duplication.‖127 Despite the apparent sequencing in which NATO‘s 
initial regional counter-piracy operation Allied Protector (the first Western operation launched 
pursuant to the UN Security Council resolutions) was followed by the EU NAVFOR launch of 
Operation Atalanta in December 2008, such sequencing ultimately appears to have been 
unintended, as evidenced by NATO‘s launch of its follow-up operation Ocean Shield in early 
2009. In terms of the two operations‘ attractiveness to their respective member states, Gebhard 
and Smith find that ―EU NAVOFR ‗Atalanta‘ is the more resourced operation‖ and ―while 
NATO‘s mandate is broader on paper, the EU has a more evolved portfolio as a comprehensive 
security provider.‖128 
 
5.2.2  Informal Channels: SHADE, Information Exchange Systems and Their 
Results 
 Despite these seemingly inauspicious beginnings to operational cooperation and 
coordination recent literature from Gebhard, Smith, and the EU Institute on Security Studies 
indicates that this initial risk of competition via duplication of effort in an overlapping EU and 
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NATO out-of-area missions has largely been avoided by the embrace of informal mechanisms—
similar to the theater-specific informal political cooperation discussed above.  
 
Precedents for Multinational Presence and Informal Channels 
 In 2007 and 2008 the UN Security Council passed a number of resolutions calling for an 
international response to a sharp spike in incidences of piracy in the Horn of Africa region. 
While these resolutions were indeed followed by a large and diverse response from naval actors 
including the thesis‘ main actors, the region already hosted the presence of various independent 
deployers including unitary state actors like Canada, Denmark, France and the Netherlands 
along with the U.S.-coordinated multilateral coalition, the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF).129 
Indeed, the U.S. Combined Task Force (CTF) 150 was established via U.S. Naval Central 
Command to pursue general maritime security and counter-terrorism objectives following the 
attacks of September 11, 2001.130 In addition to a precedent for the presence of extraregional 
naval actors in the Horn of Africa region, Gebhard and Smith present a precedent for inter-actor 
coordinating mechanisms in the form of the EU Naval Coordination Cell, or NAVCO. Beginning 
in September 2008 and prior to becoming part of EU‘s Operation Atalanta, NAVCO served to 
―enhance coordination and cooperation for a shared objective based on the scope of United 
Nations Security Council resolution 1816.‖131  
 Hence there were precedents both for a multinational presence and mechanisms for 
MMSC in the Horn of Africa region in the period leading up to the international community‘s 
more concentrated response to regional piracy beginning in 2008. However, the concentration 
and plurality of the response from 2008 has seen the development of multiple highly developed 
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mechanisms for maritime security cooperation and coordination. As discussed above, the 
CGPCS is one such venue that managed to overcome political obstacles to cooperation by its 
informal practices. The literature on regional MMSC suggests that informal practices 
underpinned by a strong multinational and multilateral character have also been integral in 
developing and supporting mechanisms for cooperation and coordination at the operational 
level of counter-piracy missions. Gebhard and Smith contend that the informal and multilateral 
character of the operations has been crucial to overcoming Berlin Plus-related roadblocks, 
contending that:  
International context conditions EU-NATO cooperation in an important way: any EU-
NATO issue can be framed as part of the multinational maritime efforts in the region, 
which not only depoliticizes many aspects of cooperation but also facilitates the exchange 
of information and opens up opportunities for coordination, which would be hard to 
attain in the formal EU-NATO context.132 
 
As illustrated above, the importance of facilitated information exchange-based cooperation as 
an enabler inter-actor coordination of operations is not to be underestimated and will be 
demonstrated in the discussion of SHADE and its related operational mechanisms below. 
 
SHADE: Origins, Functions and Results 
 In the literature examined within this thesis, the Shared Awareness and Deconfliction 
mechanism (SHADE) has emerged as the principal vector of informal cooperation and 
coordination of regional counter-piracy operations. Its role as a forum for these activities is 
prominently described in the EU Institute for Security Studies 2014 report on the CGPCS, as 
well as in Gebhard and Smith‘s work from the same year. Interestingly, Smith‘s previous work 
from 2011 makes no explicit mention of SHADE; his 2014 co-publication nevertheless traces its 
development to late 2008.133 The EU-ISS report corroborates this chronology and indicates that 
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it is an outgrowth of the CGPCS‘s Working Group One, and thus a further result of ad hoc U.S. 
policy entrepreneurship within this theater of operations.134 
 According to Marcus Houben, the explicit reason for SHADE‘s creation is ―to facilitate 
operational, i.e. naval, coordination.‖135 SHADE‘s functioning revolves around an ―open 
architecture‖ in which all those actors involved in naval operations in the Horn of Africa and the 
greater Indian Ocean region are welcome to participate, although meetings exhibit ―hardly any 
formal rules… no formal conclusions‖ and as a result ―no decision is taken.‖136 As echoed by 
other report contributors, Houben asserts that such persistent informality was intended and 
designed by SHADE‘s creators—for which he designates the U.S.-led CMF and EU NAVFOR, 
although Gebhard and Smith suggest that the CMF took the lead and that the EU and NATO 
followed.137, 138 Regardless of whom should be credited for SHADE‘s creation and in one of the 
few explicit derogations from its informal design, its meetings are exclusively organized by these 
three actors on a semi-rotating basis with ―a permanent CMF chair and a rotational EU or NATO 
chair.‖139 While the EU-ISS report establishes that the CGPCS receives financial support from a 
United Nations-managed trust fund, it is unclear whether SHADE receives any of these 
resources.140 However, given that the CMF hosts the meetings as a permanent co-chair at its 
Headquarters in Bahrain, it seems likely that U.S.-led coalition bears a significant portion of the 
organizational costs, possibly with the support its rotating EU and NATO co-chairs. 
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In terms of SHADE‘s ability to overcome Berlin Plus-related obstacles to security 
cooperation, Smith and Gebhard find that ―EU-NATO cooperation at the operational and 
tactical levels profits greatly from the involvement in multinational coordination mechanisms 
that have a pragmatic focus on joint operational efforts rather than on political sensitivities 
within or between any of the coalitions involved.‖141 
Having established SHADE‘s origins and multinational, informal design, it is time to 
examine how it functions. Oceans Beyond Piracy, a Colorado-based non-profit organization and 
observer of international counter-piracy efforts notes that SHADE meetings place a strong 
emphasis on ―information sharing and the exchange of views between stakeholders from force-
providing nations‖ and ―are also used as a forum to coordinate and de-conflict ongoing military 
counter-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden and the western Indian Ocean.‖  In addition to 
regrouping present fleets, meetings have grown to include representatives from the maritime 
industry, international organizations and non-governmental organizations and take place every 
eight weeks.142 According to Gebhard and Smith, the actual chairs from the respective Western 
naval missions never hold ranks higher than Colonel or Commander, which ―helps keep politics 
out‖ in order to better enable operational coordination and best practices among deployed 
forces and merchant vessels.143  
All of the sources pertinent to SHADE consulted in this case study seem to concur that 
its primary accomplishment in reducing regional incidences of piracy has been the creation of 
the International Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC).144 According to Houben, the IRTC 
serves to facilitate ―the secure transit of civilian shipping through pirate-infested waters… the 
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coordination of naval escorts of vulnerable civilian shipping in the IRTC and the Gulf of Aden… 
and the protection of shipments from the World Food Programme to Somalia‖ principally by 
designating specific operational time slots and geographic zones to force-deploying nations.145 
Noting the very large area to be patrolled and the concentration of actors, Gebhard and Smith 
find that the IRTC ―not only reduces the area of operations, but also allows for more concerted-
task sharing between the three multinational deployments.‖146 The authors also clarify that, as 
with SHADE itself, the IRTC coordinator role is rotated among CMF, EU and NATO leadership 
―to ensure tactical coordination.‖ Such tactical coordination is apparently based on ―the IRTC 
Coordination Guide, a gentlemen‘s agreement to keep the number of ships per area within the 
IRTC minimum: ten to eight vessels at a time to ensure good coverage.‖147 It is important to note 
that while the U.S.-led CMF, EU and NATO forces are presented as the most implicated in 
SHADE‘s creation and implementation, other extraregional actors are also taking part in such 
efforts. Oceans Beyond Piracy indicates that through SHADE 
China, India and Japan in early 2012 agreed to coordinate their merchant vessel escort 
convoys through the Internationally Recognized Transit Corridor (IRTC) with one 
country being ‗reference nation‘ for a period of three months on a rotational basis. In 
June 2012 it was announced that South Korea would join these three countries to further 
enhance the naval operations against pirates. 148 
 
But if SHADE has provided a general forum for tactical informational exchange, operational 
coordination, and the management of its IRTC offshoot, six-month rotations and bi-monthly 
meetings surely cannot account for real-time tactical coordination such as that necessary to 
coordinate ships‘ movements in the IRTC and greater Horn of Africa region. Indeed, such efforts 
are supported by the existence of complementary information and communication systems, 
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which allow for real time cooperation and coordination via information exchange. Two such 
systems, MERCURY and the Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa (MSC – HOA) have 
been described as essential to the efforts undertaken by SHADE participants and actors who 
manage and make use of the ITRC. 
 Gebhard and Smith and Houben describe MERCURY (or Mercury net) as a ―crucial‖ 
instrument in facilitating inter-organizational and multinational cooperation in the region. 
MERCURY is presented as a dedicated and secured internet-based network through which 
unclassified information is exchanged in a ―neutral communications channel‖ that ―allows all 
SHADE participants to coordinate in real time.‖149 Gebhard and Smith identify the British naval 
forces as the initiators of the system prior to its adoption by SHADE; according to one of their 
sources, MERCURY is an ―innovative‖ solution that overcomes communications-blockages 
between EU – NATO as well as with other participating nations with whom neither organization 
necessarily has a formal framework for communication exchange.150 All three of the above 
authors also reference MSC – HOA as an important contribution to the interface between 
security actors and industry representatives. As an element of EU Operation Atalanta, MSC – 
HOA ―provides 24-hour monitoring of vessels transitioning through the Gulf of Aden‖ and 
allows shipping operators to register their vessels‘ movements in a shared database while 
providing ―the latest anti-piracy guidance.‖151 
 The sources consulted in this case study have presented substantial evidence of the 
development of informal channels, both at the political and operational levels, that have allowed 
participants in the international response to piracy in the Horn of Africa region to cooperate and 
coordinate their maritime security efforts despite existing political or institutional obstacles. The 
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EU-ISS report makes allusions to such obstacles, including Cyprus‘ role in the Participation 
Problem as it affected its potential CGPCS ‗membership,‘ but otherwise tended to focus on the 
possible hesitations of non-Western security actors to ‗follow the lead‘ of a NATO-based 
coalition. While not impugning the organization‘s objectivity, it is important to note that it is the 
EU‘s official analytical body concerning the CFSP and CSDP and is entirely funded by EU 
Member States; this may explain the hesitation to discuss the sensitive and complex relationship 
between the EU and NATO.152 In contrast, Gebhard and Smith explicitly grapple with the 
possible issues of inter-organizational competition between the two actors and their impacts on 
political and operational cooperation and coordination; they also make sure to underline that 
they have received no specific grant or funding for their work.153 Regardless, both sources 
strongly support the assertions that informal maritime security coordination and cooperation 
have been instrumental in reducing regional incidences of piracy from a peak of 176 attacks in 
2010 to just two in 2014, of which neither resulted in a successful hijacking.  
The scope of this case study has been to focus explicitly on the realities of piracy at sea in 
the Horn of Africa region. However, many of the actors present in naval operations have also 
undertaken extensive comprehensive efforts relating to the stabilization of Somalia, as well as 
the legal pursuit of captured pirates wherever and whenever possible. It seems likely that these 
two examples alone could have also helped to reduce incidences of piracy by stemming their 
very inception on land by supporting Somali state-building and raising awareness among those 
potentially drawn to piracy of the very real legal ramifications of such activity.  
 Thus, while observers can note that the international naval response to piracy in the 
Horn of Africa region has indeed presided over such a considerable decline, it is impossible to 
wholly attribute this success to their efforts. If approached from the perspective of politico-
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institutional obstacles within the TSR and the potential for inter-organizational competition that 
these create, the story can be interpreted more clearly. Despite the initial lack of coordination in 
the Western naval response to regional piracy, as evidenced by the mere presence of three 
overlapping missions with near-identical tasks, it would appear that the U.S., NATO and EU 
ultimately succeeded in cooperating on and coordinating at the operational level of their 
maritime security missions.  Making concerted efforts to depoliticize their interactions by 
exploiting a strongly multinational context, the CMF and more importantly, the EU and NATO, 
effectively exchanged information and adapted their tactical approaches to maximize their 
resources and minimize the tensions of potential overlap via fora and mechanisms like the 
CGPCS, SHADE, IRTC, MERCURY, and MSC – HOA. The implications of this successful, 
informal security cooperation for the general health of the TSR will be addressed in the 
conclusions in the following chapter. 
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CHAPTER SIX: CONCLUSIONS
 
6.1  Transatlantic Security Regime: Cooperation, Competition or Both? 
In examining recent developments in the TSR and the interactions of its primary actors 
while combatting piracy in the Horn of Africa region, this thesis has sought to provide a better 
understanding of what transatlantic security means in theory and in practice in the 21st 
century‘s increasingly multipolar world. Has the regime emerged intact despite the rise of 
external regional powers and the internal emergence of another regional security organization? 
Most critically and in reference to the original research question, does the presence of 
simultaneous missions from the TSR‘s main actors indicate increased inter-actor competition, 
or rather, a more flexible conception of security cooperation within the regime?  
At the highest levels of the TSR‘s politico-institutional relationships, there are no clear 
answers to these questions. Although the ESDP/CSDP‘s inception and design were informed by 
the preferences of the U.S. as regional hegemon and without prejudice to NATO‘s primacy as the 
foremost regional security organization within the TSR, complex political disagreements have 
changed what appeared to be the course of European security in Berlin in 2003.  As a result, EU 
– NATO cooperation as provided for by the 2003 Berlin Plus framework has only brought to 
fruition two of the EU‘s total 34 civilian and military missions to date. Ongoing political disputes 
between Turkey and Cyprus led to and have sustained the breakdown of Berlin Plus and thus of 
most formally planned aspects of EU – NATO cooperation.  However, this thesis has highlighted 
the fact that this breakdown has been exploited by certain EU Member States, notably but not 
solely France, in order to advance national preferences for a stronger and more autonomous 
European defense and security policy. Furthermore, NATO‘s transformation into an out-of-area 
actor and exporter of security has not always met with public approval in European member 
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states like Germany, thereby reinforcing the impression of diverging interests within the TSR. 
The U.S. response to this divergence has been mixed: although it has attempted to overcome 
such obstacles by creating informal channels for inter-organizational communication, it seems 
to prefer achieving its security and defense objectives by developing coalitions of the willing, 
whether through NATO or other multinational coalitions, over using its resources to engineer 
the political rapprochements necessary to mend the EU – NATO cooperation breakdown. To 
most casual observers, all of these factors present an inherent context of competition in which 
the latter two actors seek to maximize their own legitimacy as actors within the regime. The 
possibility that the EU – NATO cooperation breakdown deprives the CSDP of access to NATO 
military assets could in fact be a positive development for the defense industries of certain EU 
member states has not been discussed, but could eventually be examined in an in-depth 
exploration of what form resource competition between the regional security actors takes or 
would take.  
Researchers like Michael Kluth and Jess Pilegaard have made interesting observations 
about the build-up of naval capacity in certain EU member states that could inform such a 
debate on resource competition.154 Ultimately, if one accepts the conceit of internecine TSR 
competition based on the Clinton-era NATO doctrine of the ―3 D‘s‖ with special attention to 
duplication and discrimination, then isolating such instances of competition becomes easier. 
The Horn of Africa naval operations case study, whose conclusions are presented below, 
clearly represents a situation in which the EU and NATO have launched and maintain very 
similar missions (if we stick to the actual naval missions themselves) and in which, at least 
formally, the organizations cannot engage in information- or resource-based cooperation due to 
the Participation Problem of mutual discrimination between respective members Cyprus and 
Turkey. The fact that the EU has replicated NATO‘s out-of-area evolution by rapidly engaging in 
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out-of-area operations following the breakdown of Berlin Plus seems to further corroborate 
competition.  However, if competition is apparent in the missions‘ duplication of tasks, the 
conclusions on the maritime case study below also find that operational realities do not always 
reflect what seems apparent at the macro-political level. 
 
6.2  MMSC Case Study Conclusion 
The presence of simultaneous missions is indicative of the breakdown of the formal 
channels of political cooperation between two of the three key actors within the TSR, the EU and 
NATO. The fact that Turkey has used its NATO membership to block Cyprus from signing of a 
bilateral security agreement with NATO has allowed other EU member states, notably France, to 
push for augmenting the CSDP both in autonomy and capacity for diverse civilian and military 
missions. The expansion of CSDP missions into out-of-area operations where formal 
cooperation with NATO is not possible due to these political crosscurrents has created a reality 
in which EU and NATO missions may at best duplicate efforts, and at worst compete directly in 
the same mission space. The political drive for such competition is evident in the overlapping 
Western counter-piracy operations in the Horn of Africa. In an evolved TSR in which the CSDP 
seeks to take up the mantle of provider for European security and defense interests and NATO 
legitimizes its continued existence as a provider of global security and defense interests through 
out-of-area operations, the presence of an EU military operation that serves the same purpose as 
NATO missions—in this case, Atalanta and Ocean Shield—amounts to competition as it 
threatens to undermine NATO‘s continued legitimacy as a security actor. 
The breakdown of formal political cooperation between the two actors has directly 
hampered their ability to cooperate and coordinate their operational efforts in terms of joint 
planning/command as well as information and resource exchange/pooling as intended by the 
Berlin Plus agreement. But this political breakdown of cooperation and coordination can 
obfuscate the very real cooperation and coordination that has taken place on the ground, sea 
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and air in our case study on counter-piracy operations in the Horn of Africa. Although the 
literature discussed in chapter five points to the strong impact of the multinational and 
multilateral context that has conditioned this operational coordination and cooperation, it 
nevertheless appears that with the support of the U.S. (as a unitary actor) the EU and NATO 
have overcome obstacles to informational exchange and the coordination of their deployed 
forces while combating regional piracy.  
By developing and exploiting informal and depoliticized channels with a strong 
multinational and multilateral character, the U.S., the EU and NATO have created two 
mechanisms by which they can cooperate and coordinate their counter-piracy missions while 
sidestepping the blockage of formal channels caused by the Participation Problem and the 
resultant breakdown of the Berlin Plus framework for EU-NATO interaction. By inviting other 
extraregional actors, institutions, and industry representatives, the CGPCS creates a 
depoliticized forum for informal political interaction, in a sense replicating the way in which 
PSC-NAC should allow for high-level political interaction between the EU and NATO. 
Meanwhile and as an outgrowth of the CGPCS, SHADE has evolved as an equally informal 
mechanism wherein the U.S., EU and NATO are nevertheless able to actively coordinate their 
deployed forces along with other actors—yet it is always chaired by a commander from one of 
these three actors. Finally, the development and use of MSCHOA and Mercury information 
systems within these two fora helps to overcome the aforementioned obstacles to information 
exchange and thus support the informal cooperation and coordination in this theater of 
operations.  
 
6.3  General Conclusions and Openings 
The breakdown of Berlin Plus and formal EU-NATO security cooperation have indeed 
led to the possibility for competition and even the appearance of competition between the two 
organizations—primarily concerning the scope each other‘s roles and their corresponding, 
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respective legitimacy for these roles within the TSR.  This competition is evidenced by the mere 
presence of the two actors‘ out-of-area counter-piracy missions in the Horn of Africa region. 
However, this appearance of political competition belies a different reality at the operational 
level of these specific missions in which EU and NATO complement each other ―in the spirit‖ of 
what Berlin Plus intended. Thus in this case, informal cooperation and coordination would seem 
to reflect a more flexible TSR in which both the EU and NATO can play important roles as 
security actors. However, as Gebhard and Smith have pointed out, such ad-hoc, informal and 
non-Berlin Plus security cooperation is not a long-term solution and will resolve neither the 
participation problem nor the breakdown in formal cooperation that has now endured for longer 
than a decade. Maintaining the status quo by failing to resolve the Participation Problem will 
likely continue to permit certain member states from respective organizations to exploit the 
breakdown to advance national priorities, security and otherwise; in so doing, they create 
further opportunities in which EU and NATO interactions exhibit competition or the potential 
for competition. Without substantive revision of the Berlin Plus framework, the resolution of 
Cypriot – Turkish relations or the introduction of an innovative formal solution to the problems 
occasioned by these issues, prospects for a TSR in which the EU and NATO routinely realize 
formal cooperation seem unlikely. While the semi-institutionalization of informal cooperation 
mechanisms such as those developed to combat piracy in the Horn of Africa serve to mitigate 
the challenges encountered by the staff of these organizations as they interact, ad hoc and 
operation-specific solutions do not address the continuing existence of macro-level problems. 
Meanwhile, the United States‘ continues to call for burden-sharing at the highest levels: 
President Obama has beseeched European allies to materially demonstrate their continued 
engagement to the TSR as recently as the summer of 2014.155 In the eyes of the present U.S. 
administration and those that follow, a European failure to demonstrate such commitment to 
                                                        
155 Obama, Barack, ―We Can‘t Do it Alone,‖ The Atlantic Council, June 3, 2014, 
http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/obama-warns-nato-allies-to-share-defense-burden-we-
can-t-do-it-alone 
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the TSR could reinforce U.S. ambivalence towards it. Although undoubtedly reinforced by 
bipolarity and the presence of the perceived Soviet threat, the U.S. presided over a largely 
cohesive regional security regime for half of a century. If this regime and its organizational 
actors the EU and NATO cease to deliver results, the U.S. arguably has little incentive to remain 
tied to the principles and the spirit of collective defense. A combination of budgetary concerns 
and war weariness may lead it to embrace the principles of offshore balancing—a cautious, 
strategic retreat from hegemony reminiscent of the U.S.‘ pre-World War I penchant for 
isolationism but with a post-World War II nuclear arsenal—or, as it has recently done, to 
increasingly seek out European and non-European partners with which to build coalitions of the 
willing. This thesis case study has featured just such a coalition in the form of the Combined 
Maritime Forces, which features members from over 25 nations from various regions of the 
world.  
Viewed through the lens of this thesis‘ theoretical framework of international regime and 
hegemonic stability theories, the recent changes in the TSR should not necessarily lead to its 
demise. The principle of collective defense among its members still holds and is now enshrined 
both in the regime‘s original formal multinational organization NATO and the EU through its 
growth as a security actor. The same is true for the reduction in U.S. hegemonic status vis-à-vis 
increasingly global multipolarity, as this does not diminish the sunk costs it has invested in the 
regime‘s establishment and does not call into question its dedication to the principle of 
collective defense. Nor does the fact that the EU has added security decision-making procedures 
and capacities call into question the principles and norms on which the initial TSR was 
established. However, persisting political and institutional obstacles between the EU and NATO 
will continue to create the potential for inter-organizational competition and duplication of 
effort and diminish the regime‘s value as a facilitator of agreement and collective action. This 
last risk could undermine the regime‘s continued existence if its participants, like in the U.S. 
example above, prefer to seek such facilitated agreement and action elsewhere. 
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Regime theory, as discussed above, has been valuable in providing the flexibility 
necessary to frame to the transatlantic security regime based on common principles, norms, 
rules and procedures. Conceptions of hegemonic stability proved most valuable in establishing 
the historical context in which the regime was first established and maintained through to the 
end of the Cold War. However, the fact that many realist perspectives predict the demise of 
regimes or alliances once a prevailing threat is removed seems to be disproven by the fact that, 
despite obstacles to formal cooperation, the transatlantic security regime continues to be 
inhabited by like-minded actors who often identity and address threats in similar ways—like in 
the Horn of Africa—even when such formal cooperation proves difficult or impossible. This 
thesis has raised other puzzles that call for future exploration. Such puzzles include the curious 
sequencing between the initial NATO Allied Provider mission, the EU NAVFOR Operation 
Atalanta and NATO‘s follow-up Ocean Shield operation, and the political economy of security 
competition and cooperation within the transatlantic security regime among others. Closer 
examination of unitary state actors apart from the United States was infeasible given the scale of 
this current project; the same was true for closer examination of EU and NATO decision-making 
procedures and other institutional dynamics. Thus, future exploration could likely benefit from 
both liberal intergovernmentalist and institutionalist perspectives to the transatlantic security 
regime generally and to motivations of its numerous actors in launching their respective 
counter-piracy operations in the Horn of Africa region. 
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